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DICKINSON

LAW

REVIEW

POST-INCORPORATION SUBSCRIPTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA
We are perhaps best acquainted with the transaction involving subscription
to shares of an already existing corporation. In many instances, however, subscriptions are solicited prior to incorporation in order to provide funds for organization. Within the scope of these two situations-and in particular of the
former situation-the problem presented for solution is whether the subscription
agreement should be interpreted as a contract to make the subscriber a shareholder at a future day or whether he becomes a shareholder as soon as he subscribes. The chief object of this note is to consider how the Pennsylvania courts
have dealt with this problem in interpreting subscription contracts which have
failed to stipulate clearly the rights and legal relationships of the parties.
Before discussing the point at which a subscriber becomes vested with the
status of "shareholdership" it is necessary to understand various terms with
which we will be dealing.
"Shareholdership" is a status consisting of certain legal relations between a
person and a corporation and symbolized by the term "corporate share". A
"share" implies a number of separable legal relations of which the following
are the legal incidents: (1) right to vote; (2) right to participate in "capital
distributions"; (3) right to participate in "net earnings" or "surplus"; (4) right
to examine the corporate books; (5) right to maintain a representatiVe suit; (6)
duty to pay "calls" or "assessments"; (7) responsibility to corporate creditors to
the extent of "capital contributions"; (8) further responsibility to corporate
creditors where imposed by statute. 1
The terms "creation of shares" and "issuance of shares" have been used interchangeably by courts with consequent confusion as to their particular significance. A more precise meaning of these terms should be formulated. The expression "creation of shares" is frequently used to describe an increase in the
corporation's authorized capital stock but this increase, in fact, merely results in
the corporation's having an additional power to create shares. The shares themselves are "held in the treasury" and require a further act by the corporation to
place them on the market. As stated by the Tentative Draft of the Reitatement
of the Law of Business Associations: "Shares are units of existing legal relations".2 Hence the "creation of shares" should bring into existence new units of
legal relations, between the corporation and the persons who have subscribed to
the shares. The term "creation of shares" is most accurately used, therefore, with
reference to a "transaction purporting to result in a change in the number or
character of shares outstanding".2a The term "issuance of shares" imports a
IFrey, Post-incorporationSubscriptions and Other Contracts to Create Shares at a Future Time,
(1929)2 77 U. OF PA. L. R. 750-83, 754.
Tentative Draft No. 2, (1929) Chap. 3, Topic 4-Special Note at p. 9.
2alhid.
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transfer by the corporation of something already in existence and, therefore,
should be used only "in connection with 'share certificates', the tangible 'evidence
of 'shares' ".2b The Pennsylvania courtss and the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law 4 have adopted this distinction.
The problem of when the subscriber to stock becomes a shareholder is easily
solved by a carefully drafted written contract in which the intention of the parties is set out. Or a statute might establish a convenient rule that only those persons whose names appear on the register of shareholders shall be deemed actual
shareholders, as distinguished from those persons who have agreed to become
shareholders. Unfortunately, the criterion for determining the status of a shareholder is not so simple in the absence of a statute establishing such rules and
where the written contract fails to indicate the intent of the parties in this respect.
All that is necessary to constitute a person a shareholder under the common
law view is a manifested present intention on his part and on the part of the
company that the relation of shareholder and corporation exist between them.
When that intention exists, the relationship is at once established without further formalities. 5
According to the Pennsylvania cases we must first distinguish between a
contract of membership in an existing corporation and a contract to subscribe for
shares at a future day in an existing corporation. The case of Bole v. Fulton
points out that the contract among the members of a corporation already in existence "gives the contracting parties the status of shareholders; it invests them
with the continuing rights of shareholders, together with the corresponding liabilities; and the performance of this contract will always be specifically enforced,
though a failure to perform rarely presents a ground for an action for damages"6 On the other hand, a contract to subscribe for shares at a future day is
an executory contract which must be executed in some manner in order to give
the subscriber the status of a shareholder. The Pennsylvania court at this point
distinguishes between a contract to become a shareholder in a corporation not yet
created (a pre-incorporation subscription) and a contract to purchase shares in an
2b1bid.

8Cooke v. Marshall, 191 Pa. 315, 43 A. 314 (1899); see, Yetter v. Del. R. R. Co., 206 Pa.
485, 4489 (1903) ; Grange Nat. Bank v. Collman, 306 Pa. 200, 203, 159 A. 26, 26 (1932).
Act of May 5, 1933, P.L. 364, 16 PS 2852. The act defines shares as "units into which the
shareholders' rights to participate in the control of a business corporation . . . are divided": section
2. "Every business corporation shall have power to create and issue one or more classes or kinds of
shares . . .": section 601. The act thereby impliedly recognizes that the creation of shares brings
into existenre new units of legal relations. "Unless otherwise provided in its articles, a business
corporation may issue shares, . . . without first offering them to shareholders of any elass or
classes": section 611. In order to offer shares to shareholders the shares must have been already
created, thus the issuance of shares must mean that shares are in existence and thereafter "Every
shareholder of record shall be entitled to a share certificate representing the shares owned by him":
section 607D.
51 Machen on Corporations, § 173.
6233 Pa. 609, 611, 82 A. 947 (1912).
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already existing corporation (a post-incorporation subscription).
In the former contract, since there is no corporation in existence with which
the subscriber may contract, he becomes a member of the corporation, entitled to
all the rights and liabilities of nembership, as soon as incorporation takes place. 7
The theory is that since the corporation was created on the strength of the subscriptions, the subscriber becomes a shareholder on incorporation subject to an
absolute duty to pay for the shares subscribed as well as other concomitant liabilities of a shareholder.8 The early Pennsylvania cases held that no condition in
a pre-incorporation subscription would be recognized.9
In the latter contract-a post-incorporation subscription-a completely organized corporation has "created" new shares. The subscription itself, however,
does not make the subscriber a shareholder; it is a mere contract by the corporation to sell shares to the subscriber. That is, the subscription is but the contract
to purchase and payment for the shares is all that is required to execute the contract and to transform the subscriber into a shareholder, whether or not a certificate has been issued. 10 The Pennsylvania courts have consistently adopted this
requirement of payment for shares as the solution to the problem of the time at
which a post-incorporation subscriber assumes the status of shareholder. In one
case part payment was deemed sufficient to vest the subscriber with this new

7
Muncy Traction Engine Co. v. Green, 143 Pa. 269, 13 A. 747 (1888); Auburn Bolt & Nut
Works v. Shultz, 143 Pa. 256, 22 A. 904 (1891); Hawthorn Bottle Co. v. Cribbs, 51 Pa. Super. 555
(1912); Garrett v. Dillsburg & M. R. Co., 78 Pa. 465, 468 (1875); Schmitt, Rec. v. Kulamur, 267
Pa. 1, 6, 110 A. 169, 171 (1920); South West Pennsylvania Fair Assoc. v. Greer, 11 Pa. Super.
103, 107 (1899).
SGarrett v. Dillsburg & M. R. Co., 78 Pa. 465 (1875); Jeannette Bottle Works v. J. P. Schatl,
13 Pa. Super. 96 (1906) ; Commonwealth v. Mfrs. Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 11 Phila. 550 (1875).
The cases base this theory on the doctrine of estoppel.
'Pittsburgh & S. R. Co. v. Biggar, 34 Pa. 455 (1859); Bedford R. Co. v. Bowser, 48 Pa. 34
(1864); Caley v. Phila. & C.C.R. Co., 80 Pa. 363 (1876) ; Boyd v. Peach Bottom Ry. Co., 90 Pa.
169 (1879); see, Pittsburgh & C. R. Co. v. Stewart, 41 Pa. 54, 58 (1861); McCarty v. The Selinsgrove & N.B.R. Co., 87 Pa. 332, 336 (1878). The court in Jeannette Bottle Works v. Schall, 13
Pa. Super. 96, 102 (1906), refuses to follow the railroad cases and holds that a subscription agreement "may embrace any condition which does not involve a viclation of law or of'the rights of
future creditors, and by a condition thus appearing upon the face of the agreement, all the associates
and the corporation, when formed, are bound."
The courts have recognized conditional post-incorporalion subscriptions. Phila. & N.C.R. Co. v.
Hickman, 28 Pa. 318 (1857); Pittsburgh & C. R. Co. v. Stewart, 41 Pa. 54 (1861); Hanover
Junction & S. R. Co. v. Haldeman, 82 Pa. 36 (1876); see, Caley v. Phila. & C.C.R. Co., 80 Pa. 363,
368 (1876); McCarty v. The Selinsgrove & N.B.R. Co., 87 Pa. 332, 336 (1878); Jeannette Bottle
Works
v. Schall, 13 Pa. Super. 96, 102 (1906).
10
Bole v. Fulton, 233 Pa. 609, 82 A. 947 (1912).
The reason for this rule is found in the
explanation that "if by a mere subscription for new stock the subscriber becomes a stockholder, he
at once becomes clothed with all the rights of a stockholder, and without the payment of a dollar he
would be at liberty to vote his stock, and entitled to claim dividends upon, it. Hence, the policy of a
corporation might be molded or controlled by mere subscribers, who have paid nothing upon their
subscriptions to the prejudice or loss of the full-paid shareholders, whose money, contributed
in the beginning, had actually developed the enterprise." Baltimore City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Hambleton, 77 Md. 341, 26 A. 279, 280 (1893).
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status;" in other cases, full payment was required. 12
"Should payment for the shares subscribed be essential to vest in the
subscriber the rights of a shareholder? The answer to this question is to be found
in the Pennsylvania Business Corporations Law, which confers the status of
"shareholder" on a subscriber to shares 13 and requires full payment only as a
condition precedent to the issuance of a certificate." In the face of this statute,
the Pennsylvania courts have continued to follow the rule of Bole v. Fulton.
Moreover, the authorities generally agree that payment is not a prerequisite to
assuming the status of shareholdership.16 The early Pennsylvania case of Curry
v. Scott held as to subscribers after incorporation, "ifone has not paid his subscription in full he is a debtor for so much as remains unpaid, but he is none
the less a shareholder"."6 In Greer v. Chartiers Railway Co.,' 7 Greer was active
in soliciting subscriptions for the company and entered his own name in the subscription book. After a dispute with the company over payment for his services,
Greer erased his name from the book. The court, however, permitted the company to collect for the shares originally subscribed for on the fundamental contract principle that the company made an offer to sell shares to whomsoever
should agree to buy them by entering his name in the subscription book; and
since Greer was acting as agent to solicit shares and had subscribed for shares in
Illn Bell's Appeal, 115 Pa. 88, 8 A. 177 (1877) as to a pre-incorporation subscription the
court refused to permit the subscriber to disaffirm his contract once he had paid for one share and
transferred others since he had thereby recognized and affirmed his contract of subscription. To the
same effect as to post-incorporation subscriptions: Phila. and Gulf Steamship Co. v. Clark, 59 Pa.
Super. 415 (1915); Franklin National Bank v. Kennerly Coal & Coke Co., 300 Pa. 479, 150 A.
902 (1930).
2
1 Bender v. Wiggins, 323 Pa. 182, 185 A. 730 ( 1936); Schwartz v. Mfrs.' Casualty Insurance

Co., 335 Pa. 130, 6 A.(2d) 299 (1939). The lower court in Bender v. Wiggins, 23 Pa. D. & C.
646, 647 (1935) distinguishes Phila. and Gulf Steamship Co. v. Clark. supra note 11, on the ground
that "Apparently in that case, defendant paid $900 on account of his total subscription. In thecase
before us, . . . he paid in full for the stock issued to him and paid nothing on account of the unissued stock." The court therefore treats the subscription as divisible and follows Bole v. Fulton in
denying the corp-ration recovery on the shares not yet paid for.
13Act of May 5, 1933, P.L. 364, Art. VI, 15 PS 2852. Section 604: "Unless otherwise provided in the subscription agreement, subscriptions for shares, whether made before or after the organization of a corporation, shall be paid in full at such time, or in such installments and at such
times, as shall be determined by the board of directors. . . . If a shareholder be indebted to a business corporation on account of unpaid subscriptions for shares, the corporation shall have a lien on
shares for such indebtedness." Section 605: "When any shareholder fails to pay any call upon his
shares properly made by the directors, at a time when such payment is due, the directors may proceed
to collect the amount due in the same manner as any debt due the corporation ... "
14Act of May 5,1933, P.L. 364, § 606(A): "Every shareholder of record shall be entitled to a
share certificate representing the shares owned by him, but a share certificate shall not be issued by a
corporation to any shareholder until the shares represented thereby have been fully paid for."
16"It goes without saying that, in general, payment for the shares subscribed for is not necessary in order that the subscriber may become a shareholder. Indeed, frequently in England and
sometimes in the United States, corporations carry on business for years although only a fraction of
the nominal value of their outstanding shares has been paid in. . . .It is difficult to say that as an
unbending rule of law, new shares created by way of increase of capital" (as was the situation in
the Pennsylvania cases) "can never be issued until paid for". I Machen on Corporations (1908)
§ 174.
1654 Pa. 270, 276 (1867).
1'796
Pa. 391 (1880).
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the book, he declared his acceptance and was bound to pay for the shares subscribed for.
In regard to the necessity for issuance of a share certificate, Frey points out
that this can be answered only by determining the importance of such certificate
in the commercial world in which it is to be used.17a The importance of the possession of a share certificate has been increased by the provisions of section 10
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act as adopted in Pennsylvania in 1911.18 The
certificate is "merely the written evidence of the stockholder's rights as such"
and its nonissuance does not deprive him of any of his rights or relieve him of
any of his liabilities."9
Like many corporation problems, the question of whether one who is designated in the contract as a "subscriber" was intended to become a shareholder
immediately or merely contracts to become a shareholder at a future date, cannot
be confined to convenient rules. Each case presents a different situation, the
solution of which is dependent on the terms of the contract or conduct of the
parties, interpreted in the light of all the circumstances. 20 One court has stated:
"Whether the instrument indicates an intention to become a stockholder prior to
2
the party thereto fully performing his contract is the important element". 1
As noted previously, the Pennsylvania courts, when confronted with an
action by the corporation to obtain the contract price of the shares, have characterized the transaction as a "subscription" or as a "purchase and sale", depending on the facts of the particular case.22 The intent of the parties may be more
accurately ascertained, however, by looking at the legal relations between the
7

1 a"In the case of a small, closed corporation, possession of a share certificate may be of rela-

tively slight importance to the other party once he has acquired the shareholdership contracted for.
But where the transaction involves a large corporation whose shares are listed on a recognized exchange and are actively dealt in, the commercial correlation between a share certificate and the shares
it evidences may be so great that without a certificate the other party would be seriously handicapped in the enjoyment of that which he sought by the contract, even though technically he had
acquired the contemplated shareholdership. Under these latter circumstances the courts might well
deem the corporation's performance as not substantially complete until it had tendered to the other
party a share certificate or an instrument which those dealing therein would regard as its equivalent." Frey, supra note 1, at 771.
18Act of May 5, 1911, P.L. 126, § 10, 15 PS 310: "An attempted transfer of title to a certificate
or to the shares represented thereby without delivery of the certificate shall have the effect of a
promise to transfer, and the obligation, if any, imposed hy such promise shall be determined by the
law governing the formation and performance of contracts."
19Keystone Wrapping Mach. Co. v. Bromeier, 42 Pa. Super. 384 (1910); FLETCHER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (1931)

§ 5094.

20"What the rights are of one who subscribes to capital stock must, in each instance, be determined by the contract between him and the company; and the words 'subscriber to capital stock'
cannot be held to have a fixed, definite and unchangeable meaning. In one case by the terms of the
contract the so-called 'subscriber' may have immediately become a stockholder; in another case he
might not become a stockholder until he.paid certain sums of money; and so through all the variations that contractual relations are subject to as regulated by their terms." Kruse v. Hudson County
Consumers' Brewing Co., 79 N. J. Eq. 392 (1911).
21Stern
v. Mayer, 166 Minn. 346, 207 N.W. 737 (1926).
22
Bole v. Fulton, 233 Pa. 609 (1912); Schwartz v. Mfrs.' Casualty Insurance Co., 335 Pa. 130
(1939); Phila. and Gulf Steamship Co. v. Clark, 59 Pa. Super. 415 (1915); see, McDowell v.
Lindsay, 213 Pa. 591, 593, 63 A. 130, 131 (1906).
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parties at the time for performance of the contract. Frey in his article "PostIncorporation Subscriptions and Other Contracts to Create Shares at a Future
23
Time" raises the following three questions pursuant to this inquiry:
First, "When the date to perform the contract arrives does the party automatically become the holder of the shares contracted for, or is some further act,
either on his part or on the part of the corporation or both, a prerequisite to the
existence of such shareholdership?" As was stated supra, a carefully drawn written contract will dearly define this relationship. In the absence of this, we
might proceed on the theory that the subscription contract is a continuing consent on the part of the subscriber to become a shareholder which is automatically
24
accepted by the corporation on the date for performance of the contract.
Second, "If the status of a shareholder does not automatically vest at the
date for performance of the contract, what further acts by the corporation are
required in consummating the contract?" Is sending the subscriber notice of a
shareholder's meeting or entering his name on the shareholder book sufficient,
or is tender of a share certificate essential? The ultimate issue, however, is solely
what constitutes performance of the agreement itself. Where no specific intention is manifest, Frey feels the determination of this issue depends upon "the
customs of the particular economic 'institution' involved". 25
Third, "Are the promises of the parties independent or mutually dependent?''26 That is, where the corporation promises to deliver the share certificate
and the other party promises to pay the price on an agreed date, under what
circumstances may the corporation collect the price without first tendering the
certificate and, conversely, when does the other party have the right to the certificate without rendering the price? It is acknowledged by the Pennsylvania
courts27 and by the text-writers 28 that tender of a certificate is not essential to
2

3Frey, supra note 1, at 765.
24The Pennsylvania cases have adopted this theory: Garrett v. Phila. Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa.
Super. 78 (1909). See also cases in note 7, supra. Greet v. Chartiers Ry. Co., 96 Pa. 391 (1880)
adopted a similar contract principle in stating at p. 394, "The Chartiers Railway Company made a
continuing offer which became an agreement with each acceptant for the number of shared for which
he subscribed." The cases have also held that until the articles of incorporation are filed with the
Secretary of Commonwealth the subscriber may withdraw or revoke his subscription on the ground
that the subscription is not a contract but a mere expression of the subscriber's intention to subscribe:
Strasburg R. Co. v. Echternacht, 21 Pa. 220 (1853); Donaldson v. Rollman, 23 Pa. Dist. 802
Other cases hold that the subscription
(1913); see, Phipps v. Jones, 20 Pa. 260, 264 (1853).
agreement is an absolute agreement from which the subscriber cannot withdraw: Edinboro Academy
v. Robinson, 37 Pa. 210 (1860); Shober v. Lancaster C. Park Asso., 68 Pa. 429 (1871); Jeannette
Bottle Works v. Schall, 13 Pa. Super. 96 (1906); Steamship Co. v. Murphy, 6 Phila. 224 (1867).
In McClure v. People's Freight Ry. Co., 90 Pa. 271 (1879) the court held that if the subscription is
to existing companies which are contemplating consolidation it cannot be withdrawn on the ground
that the consolidated company is not in existence, if the only thing necessary is to file the agree.
consolidation with the proper officer, -who has no discretion to reject it.
ment for
6
g Frey, supra note 1,at 765.

2SIbid.
27
Keystone Wrapping Mach. Co. v. Bromeier, 42 Pa. Super. 384 (1910); Citizens Bank v.
Rand,2 8 1 D. & C. 380 (1922).
FLETCHER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (1931),

§ 5094.
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creating the status of shareholder. The court in Bole v. Fulton citing Baltimore
City Passenger Railway Co. v. Hambleton, asserts: "Payment when called by the
company, and when made by the subscriber constitutes him a shareholder,
whether a certificate has been issued or not." 29 Having dispensed with this requirement, the court proceeds to solve its problems by conferring the status of
"shareholder" on a subscriber who comes in prior to incorporation, and by treating the subscriber to new or additional shares of an existing corporation as merely a party to a contract-which becomes fully executed on payment. In this latter situation, the case of Bender v. Wiggins30 takes the view that the right of the
corporation to the contract price is dependent on the "issuance" or "tender" to
the prospective member of the "balance of the stock". The court is following
the proposition in Bole v. Fulton that as between the parties "mutual obligations resulted-an obligation on the part of the company to furnish the stock,
and an obligation on the part of the defendant to pay for it when delivered.
These, as we have seen, were to be concurrent acts, tender and payment . . ."3t
Both Pennsylvania appellate courts have indicated in some cases that they
realize the real issue raised by the problem: whether the right to payment by the
subscriber is independent of or dependent on further "performance" by the corporation, granting that tender of a certificate is immaterial. The other decisions32
which have followed Bole v. Fulton failed to see this issue. They have looked
upon the status of the subscriber, either as "shareholder" or as "party to a contract", as decisive of his duty to pay. The Pennsylvania courts which allow nonpayment of the purchase price as a defense to a suit by the subscriber to enforce
his rights as a shareholder, should do so not on the ground that he has not become a "shareholder", but because they regard payment as an essential element
33
in the performance by the subscriber of his part of the bargain.
Where the written contract of subscription fails to state categorically under
what circumstances the party will become a shareholder, it is necessary to interpret the intention of the parties from their conduct and from the other terms of
the contract. The Tentative Draft of the Restatement of the Law of Business
Associations 4 has formulated the following rules to aid in determining this intent. They are not to be regarded, however, as absolute indications of the intent
29233 Pa. 609 at p. 613, 82 A. 947 at p. 948 (1912).
30323 Pa. 182, 185 A. 730 (1936). The court, at p. 184, says, "Inasmuch as the promises
were mutually dependent and the consideration for the payment of the second $5,000 was to be the
issuance of the balance of the stock, the burden was upon plaintiff to show such issuance, or a tender thereof, before a recovery of the remainder of the subscription price could be had." It is difficult
to ascertain from the use of the word "tender" as an alternative to "issuance" whether "issuance of
the balance of the stock" refers to the issuance of the tangible evidence of the shares-the certificate,
or to the increase in the number of shares outstanding. (See previous discussion in this Note on
"creation" and "issuance" of shares.)
31233 Pa. 609, 613, 82 A. 947, 948 (1912).
3ZSchwartz v. Mfrs.' Casualty Insurance Co., 335 Pa. 130, 6 A.(2d); 299 (1939); Phila. and
Gulf Steamship Co. v. Clark, 59 Pa. Super. 415 (1915).
supra note 1, at 771.
S3Frey,
4
3 Tentative Draft No. 2, (1929) § 42.
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of the parties.
The following facts tend to show that the agreement is a transaction for
the immediate creation of shares:
a) "a provision in the agreement at once according to the person
one or more rights normally possessed only by shareholders, such as
the right to vote, the right to participate in dividend payments, the
right to attend shareholders' meetings, the ri ht to receive reports,
and records, the right of
the right to examine the corporate books
pre-emption, or other similar rights;3 5
b) "a provision in the agreement requiring an act by the corporation or an act by the corporation with the consent of the person
though not required by the agreement, normally consistent only
with the conclusion that the person is a shareholder, such as an act
showing that payments made by the person prior to the time for
certificates are regarded as present addithe delivery of the 3share
6
tions to its capital."
The following facts tend to show that the agreement is a contract for the
future creation of shares:
a) "a provision in the agreement withholding from the person
one or more of the rights normally possessed by shareholders;
b) "a provision in the agreement at once according to the person
one or more rights not normally possessed by shareholders, such as
of the share certhe right to interest to the time for the delivery
31
tificate on all payments made prior thereto;
c) "a provision in the agreement requiring or permitting an act
by the corporation, or an act by the corporation with the consent of
the person though not required by the agreement, normally inconsistent with the conclusion that the person is a shareholder such as
an act showing that payments made prior to the time for the delivery of the share certificate are not regarded as present additions to
its capital, or a provision for forfeiture of advance payments
3
61n Sarbach v. Kansas Fiscal Agency Co., 86 Kan. 734, 122 Pac. 113 (1912) M gave a note
in payment of a subscription to stock with the option of subsequently surrendering the stock and receiving his note back. The court held M became a stockholder, and not a mere optional subscriber,
by giving a receipt for the stock "purchased by me" and a receipt for a dividend on one hundred
shares 6of stock "owned by me".
the bank received money,,
3 1n Ross v. Bank of Gold Hill, 20 Nev. 191, 19 Pac., 243 (1880)
in part payment of shares subscribed to, as part of its capital and the subscribers did not object to
this representation to third persons. The court held them to be stockholders, although one subscriber claimed he had the option to forfeit further payments and thus evado liability and' another
subscriber contended that the money paid was a loan to one of the officers of the bank.
371n Stern v. Mayer, 166 Minn. 346, 207 N.W. 737 (1926) the court considered the following
factors as indicia of an executory contract for the sale and purchase of stock rather than a subscription to stock: long-time payment terms, advance payments were to be forfeited if the applicant defaulted in payments, right to interest on payments made, the payments were not present additions
to the capital stock of the corporation, and finally, the agreement was labeled "Application for

Stock" instead of "Subscription for Stock."
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made by the person as the exclusive remedy of the corporation
should the person fail to pay any future installment as due.'"38
It is interesting to observe how the Pennsylvania courts have recognized
these elements as indicative of the intent of the parties; and how their ultimate
decision, as to whether the agreement between corporation and subscriber fell
within either one of the above categories, has coincided with their finding that
these particular relationships were present or absent. The interesting part of this
observation lies in the fact that the Pennsylvania courts are not content with so
simple a solution-they have persisted in following the complicated set of rules
set forth in Bole v. Fulton. Convenient as they may be as a guide for future
litigation, a set of rules lacks the flexibility demanded by the complexness of
this particular corporate problem. Applying the simple tests noted above, let us
see how the Pennsylvania courts in the cases previously discussed could have
reached the same conclusions.
In Bole v. Fulton 9 the court points out that no stock was ever issued in
the name of the defendant and that his name did not appear on the stock books
of the corporation, revealing an intent on the part of the corporation to deprive
defendant of the rights of other shareholders concomitant with the presence of
such elements. Within ten days after he subscribed, defendant notified the
agent to whom he gave his subscription that he would not pay it-a clear intent
on the part of the defendant not to assume the liabilities of membership in the
corporation.
In Bender v. WigginS40 the subscriber had originally paid for only half of
the shares he agreed to take and the corporation had "issued" only half the
shares to him at that time. The court acknowledges that the intent of the parties
does not appear from the agreement itself but from the parties' own construction
of the agreement as evidenced by their course of dealing under it, and concludes
that the right to payment by the corporation and the right of the subscriber to
the shares are mutually dependent.
The plaintiff in Schwartz v. Mfrs.' Casualty Insurance Co.4 1 defaulted in
payment of his subscriptions-after paying seven out of nine installments of one
subscription and two out of nine installments of a second subscription. During
the twenty-one years following the subscriptions, numerous share and cash dividends were declared by the company but none were paid to plaintiff, nor did
plaintiff ever claim any dividends. The court concludes that these facts clearly
indicate that plaintiff never became a shareholder. But the court reaches its deSThe stock-purchase certificates recently issued by the International Nickel Company contained
this typical clause: "Failure to pay any installment within the time limits above fixed and as 'above
set forth, shall operate as a forfeiture of all rights in respect of the subscription and the installments
" See Frey, supra note 1, at 758.
previously paid thereon ..
89233 Pa. 609, 82 A. 947 (1912).
40323 Pa. 182, 185 A. 730 (1936).
41335 Pa. 130, 6 A.(2d) 299 (1939).
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cision only after reiterating at length the rules set forth in Bole v. Fulton.
In Philadelphiaand Gulf Steamship Co. v. Clark42 the defendant had paid
several installments on the shares and then defaulted although, as the court admits, he never repudiated nor attempted to rescind the agreement. The court
speaks of the agreement as an executory contract which has been so far executed
as to preclude the application of the already familiar rule in Bole v. Fulton. It
is clear from the facts alone, however, that it was the defendant's intent to hold
fast to his rights under the agreement, and the corporation by suing for the unpaid balance of the subscription indicated its desire to make him one of its
members.
This discussion has sought to raise the following questions: Where a person has subscribed for shares in an already existing corporation, what is the legal
relation between the person and the corporation on the date for performance of
the contract-is he already a shareholder or is some further act required on the
part of corporation or person to establish this relationship? Will not the intent
of the parties be the ultimate test? Should we adopt a set of inflexible rules to
determine this intent or do the facts of the particular case indicate more dearly
the intent of the parties? To what extent are we aided in the determination of
these problems by precise definitions of the terms involved?
PAUL

4259 Pa. Super. 415 (1915).
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